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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
his appointments do an effective job in securing a fair trial.7 1
What, however, is the trial judge's duty when retained counsel
commits errors which prejudide an accused's right to fair trial?
It is submitted that in this situation the judge may have some
duty to privately advise the retained attorney of errors noted by
the court, because of the general duty of the judge to conduct a
fair trial. Caution should be exercised, however, so that the
judge cannot be accused of interfering with the defendant's
freedom to choose his own counsel.
Lawrence L. Jones
INVITEE STATUS IN LOUISIANA
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally the standard of care owed by an occupier of
land to one entering upon the land has been determined by the
circumstances surrounding the entry. In determining this stand-
ard, courts have considered two elements, the consent of the oc-
cupier and the economic benefit derived by him from the visit.
Based on these considerations the common law has recognized
three broad statuses: trespassers, licensees, and invitees. The
trespasser, coming on the land without the consent of the oc-
cupant and with no intention of bestowing an economic benefit,
takes the premises as he finds them. The landowner owes no
duty other than not to harm him intentionally.' The licensee
is on the land with an expressed or implied invitation from the
occupant, but with no purpose of rendering an economic benefit. 2
However, licensee status has also been given one who enters with-
out the required invitation, but who intends to bestow some real or
fancied benefit on the occupier.3  The standard of care owed is
not to injure the licensee wilfully or wantonly or cause him harm
from active negligence. The occupier must also warn the licensee
against all known hidden hazards. 4 The invitee comes on the
71. Braxton v. Peyton, 365 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Jones v. Cunningham,
313 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Mackenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960).
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 333 (1965) Barrilleaux v. Noble Drilling
Corp., 160 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
2. PROSSER, TORTS § 60, at 385 (3d ed. 1964) Taylor v. Baton Rouge Sash
& Door Works, Inc., 68 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
3. Malatesta v. Lowry, 130 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961); Mercer v.
Tremont & R. Ry., 19 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944) (plaintiff was granted
invitee status) ; Mills v. Heidingsfield, 192 So. 786 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 341 (1965) ; Potter v. Board of Comm'rs,
148 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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land with an invitation and for the purpose of rendering some
potential service or benefit for the occupier. The landowner
owes a high standard of care to the invitee, including protection
from negligence, and from reasonably discoverable hazards
created by a third party.5 Most important, the landowner owes
the duty to inspect the premises and make them safe for the
visit.6 This Comment focuses on the rights of the invitee. Its
purpose is to show how Louisiana courts have broadened this
category and to investigate ramifications resulting from this
development.
The duty of prior inspection has given rise to the doctrine
of constructive knowledge. The injured invitee need not prove
the landowner had actual knowledge of the hazard, but only that
it had existed for a sufficient length of time that a reasonable
inspection should have uncovered it.7 The higher standard of
care owed an invitee, plus this lightening of his burden of proof,
has produced a history of legal battles in which the technical
status of the injured party has overshadowed the real issue of
whether the occupier's act or omission amounted to an action-
able wrong against the plaintiff.
The redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code attempted to spell
out in broad, liberal terms the liability of a landowner for in-
juries resulting from his negligence. Article 2315 states a gen-
eral philosophy of tort law: "Every act whatever of man that
causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it hap-
pened to repair it." Article 2322 sets out more particularly the
duty a landowner has to one who is injured while on the premises:
"The owner of a building is answerable for the damage oc-
casioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair
it, or when it is the result of a vice in its original structure."
The Louisiana courts, however, have held that these articles
must be read in context with the common law technicalities as to
the status of the entrant.8
However, the Civil Code has not been without effect in this
area of tort law. The courts have faithfully guarded the civil
law obligations of a lessor to a tenant. The lessor's guaranty
5. See, e.g., Roberts v. Courville, 162 So. 2d 750 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
6. See, e.g., Manning v. Morrison Cafeterias Consolidated, Inc., 160 So. 2d
818 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
7. See, e.g., Lejeune v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 136 So. 2d 157 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1961).
8. Klein v. Young, 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495 (1927); Mills v. Heidingsfield,
192 So. 786 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
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to the lessee of the safety of the premises has been extended
to anyone who is rightfully on the premises.9 The courts in
this narrow area abandoned the technical distinction between
invitee and licensee. 10 Since there is no requirement of actual
knowledge in the guaranty of the lessor," licensees on leased
property are protected from all substantial latent defects in the
leased premises. 12
The recognition and extension of the lessor's duty to keep the
premises safe led to an anomaly. If a lessee invited a friend
onto property for the sole purpose of social pleasure, this social
guest, technically a licensee, 13 was protected from hazards, both
known and unknown to the occupier and the owner of the
premises. 4  However, if this same guest entered the property
of a homeowner and the same accident occurred he would be
denied recovery unless he could show the owner had actual
knowledge of the hidden danger, or the injury resulted from the
9. Malatesta v. Lowry, 130 So. 2d 785, 786 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) : "The
jurisprudence teems with cases holding that a landlord is bound to know whether
his build'ng is safe for the purposes for which he rents or authorizes its use or
is defective, rotten, or otherwise unsafe, and is answerable in damages, under the
above articles [LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 670, 2322 (1870)] to third persons who being
lawfully or rightfully therein are injured by reason of its defects, whether of original
construction or caused by failure to make proper repairs." (Citations omitted.)
10. Id. at 787: "In accordance with this general rule, it has been held where
a third person is injured in the leased premises by a fall from defective steps, or
by the collapse of a rotten wharf or from falling plaster or other materials, or by
a defective floor, the landlord is liable to the person injured, whether he was a
guest, roomer, visitor of the lessee, housekeeper, subtenant, daughter of subtenant,
or the wife or child of the tenant, sister of the lessee, or even a concubine." (Cita-
tions omitted.)
11. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 269, 2695 (1870).
12. Chaix v. Viau, 15 So. 2d 662, 663 (La. App. Or]. Cir. 1943) : "The alleged
defect in the flood board was not such a defect as to make the floor unsafe for
normal use. While it is true that the owner of a building is liable for the vices
and defects of construction, or for his failure to make adequate repairs, this does
not mean that he is an insurer of the safety of the occupants of the house for ac-
cidents which may befall them through their lack of ordinary observation and care.
The vices and defects spoken of in the Articles of the Civil Code must be sub-
stantial or those which are likely to cause injury to a reasonably prudent man."
James D. Davis, Liability of an Owner to, Third Persons Injured by Structural
Defects, unpublished article to appear in a later issue of the Louisiana Law Review,
deals specifically with this area, and the extension of art. 2322 to homeowners.
This article questions the soundness of the lessor-owner and homeowner distinc-
tion, and the undue complications created by this line of jurisprudence.
13. 95 A.L.R.2d 992, 1009 (1964) : "Under what has been called the 'economic
benefit' test of invitee status, an entraut upon land of another is not entitled
to the status of invitee unless the visit is directly or indirectly connected with
business dealings between them or, as it is sometimes put, unless the purpose of
the visit is to promote some real or fancied material, financial, or economic interest
of the landowner." See also Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 600 (1952).
14. Klein v. Young, 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495 (1927).
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wilful and wanton or active negligence of the landowner.15 With
this glaring discrepancy, it does not seem strange that Lou-
isiana should be the first state, and at present the only state,
to grant a social guest invitee status.1 6
LOUISIANA ENLARGEMENT OF INVITEE PROTECTION
The distinction between business and social guests was abol-
ished in Alexander v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp.17
The impact of this modification was apparent almost from the
outset. Now the entrant only has to show an invitation, and
is not required to show he came on the land for the purpose of
rendering a service to the occupier. This decision narrowed the
class of licensees only to those whom the landowner allowed
on his property out of sufferance.18 Therefore more cases come
under the reasonable care doctrine of the invitee rule, and fewer
turn on technical classifications. The emphasis has switched
from the legal question of plaintiff's status to the factual ques-
tion of whether, under the particular circumstances, there is a
breach of the duty of reasonable care.
The broadening of the invitee class has tended to make ob-
solete several arbitrary distinctions. Prime among these was
the requirement that an invitee must leave the premises within
a reasonable time after his business has been transacted. 19
Formerly loitering by a business guest would transform his
status into that of licensee. Under the expanded invitee rule,
if the party elected to stay on the premises to chat with the oc-
cupant, or to inspect the premises, he would be a social guest
and the same duty of reasonable care would apply. In reality,
unless the occupant had expressly revoked the invitation, it
would take an extreme case to reduce an invitee to the status of
a licensee.
15. Mills v. Heidingsfield, 192 So. 786 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
16. England abolished the common law distinction between invitee and licensee
by statute. The Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 (5 & 6 Eliz. 2 c, 31), §§ 2, 3. It
is interesting that both England and Louisiana restrict the use of the civil jury
trial.
17. 98 S'o. 2d 730 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) noted 19 LA. L. REV. 906 (1959).
The court stated in its opinion: "And we see no reason why the duty of ordinary
reasonable care should not be owed to social guests who are expressly invited to
the premises as well as to other invitees." Id. at 734.
18. Potter v. Board of Comm'rs, 148 So. 2d 439 (4th Cir. 1963). There has
been a trend away from the strict compliance with the common law technicalities
in all American jurisdictions. The courts have tended to draw a distinction be-
tween "bare licensees" and "licensees by implied invitation." See Annot., 95
A.L.R.2d 992, 1016 (1964).
19. See, e.g., Vargas v. Blue Seal Bottling Works, 126 So. 707 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1930).
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A logical result of the social guest-invitee rule would be
that people conducted through plants on guided tours purely for
their own intellectual satisfaction should now be treated as in-
vitees.20  Because the doctrine of reasonable care is plastic and
can be molded to fit the myriad situations that arise, and since
there is an invitation and cooperation by the occupant, there
seems to be sound reason for granting social guest standing to
such people. Another class of visitors most likely affected by
this broadened rule are people who come on land to view an ex-
hibition or demonstration. Traditionally some promotional pur-
pose or contract relationship had to be established before invitee
status attached. 21  Louisiana's appellate review of facts removes
the fear that these legal distinctions are essential to protect de-
fendants from jury mishandling of the reasonable care doctrine.
Review of facts also gives the courts an opportunity to give form
and predictability to the reasonable care concept.
PLASTICITY IN THE REASONABLE CARE DOCTRINE
The traditional concept of business, guest-invitee worked
best where the occupant held his premises open to the public.
He had reason to anticipate his premises would be used in the
manner for which they were designed. Thus the owner of a
department store, inn, 22 or theater2 3 was not unreasonably
20. See, e.g., ibid.; Myers v. Gulf Public Serv. Corp., 132 So. 416 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1931).
21. See, e.g., Barrett v. Faltico, 117 F. Supp. 95 (E.D. Wash. 1953) ; Riecke
v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n, 227 S.W. 631, 206 Mo. App. 246 (1921).
22. DeHart v. Travelers, 10 So. 2d 597, 598 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942) : "It
cannot be disputed that the proprietor of any public house of entertainment, as a
result of an implied contract, though not an insurer of the safety of his guest,
owes the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them both in person and
property, from injury at the hands of a fellow guest or guests.
"Certainly, the charge of apparent intoxication may or may not have been
within the knowledge of defendant. Harboring or permitting an intoxicated person
to remain within the cafe, necessarily involves the exercise of care, which may or
may not be reasonable, considering the likelihood of discord or brawls, and the
ultimate safety of the fellow patrons from insults or assaults..
"Guest or patrons have the corresponding right to believe that the operator,
personally or by his delegated representative, is exercising such degree of reason-
able care as shall attend to safety and orderliness." See Miller v. Derusa, 77
So. 2d 748 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955) ; Matranga v. Travelers Ins. Co., 55 So. 2d 633
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951) ; DeHart v. Travelers Ins. Co., 10 So. 2d 597 (La. App.
Onl. Cir. 1942) ; Miller v. Holsum Cafeteria, Inc., 2 So. 2d 691 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1941).
23. Businesses which require partial darkness have given the courts difficulty.
Cassanova v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, 204 La. 813, 822, 16 So. 2d 444,
447 (1943) noted 18 Tm. L. 11Ev. 646 (1944) : "The authorities are in conflict
as to what constitutes reasonable and ordinary care on the part of proprietors of
places of public amusement, but we think the authorities holding that, because
of the darkened theatres, moving picture exhibitors are held to a stricter account
in the performance of this rule express the sounder logic and the better view, for
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burdened with the obligation of maintaining safe premises,
since the premises themselves contributed to his economic gain.
However, the doctrine lost most of its rationality when a land-
owner chose to transact some incidental business at his home.
The homeowner who received his unannounced insurance agent
was charged with. the same high degree of care and required
to make the same inspection as the business establishment ex-
pecting thousands to use its premises daily.24 Now, the home-
owner is under the duty of keeping his premises reasonably safe
at any time a social or business guest should happen to be in-
vited on the premises. However, this duty can be tempered by
a more flexible handling of the reasonable care concept.
The courts have come to realize there is no set norm to judge
reasonable care or breach of duty. Not all negligence is of such
a nature as to violate the duty to use reasonable care. In Sim-
mons v. Chuck's Inc.25 the court found as a matter of fact that
the chairs in a night club had been too closely placed, and that
plaintiff's injury was caused by being hit by the backrest of
the next barstool. The court of appeal reversed the lower
court's judgment for plaintiff, and held the defendant had not
violated his duty. The court said:
"In determining what is negligent conduct we have remarked
on several occasions that there is no fixed rule; the facts and
environmental characteristics of each case must be considered
and treated individually in conformity with the true civil
law concept. Judicially we. are tending more and more to
an appreciation of the truth that, in the last analysis, there
such a. rule has the added weight of common sense behind it." But in Benton
v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 145 So. 2d 89, 92 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), the court
quoted from Daniels v. United States Cas. Co. 103 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. La.
1952) : " 'The extent of the lighting ordinarily used depends upon the nature of
the business and is generally known to those who patronize it, such as theatres or
picture shows, -where a degree of darkness is necessary to their operation, and in
other instances where the customer for one reason or another prefer and accept,
as an inducement, less than cathedral-lighting conditions. In the later cases, the
guest accepts a situation which is well known to him and it would seem to require
something more than mere inadequacy of lights to constitute negligence."
24. 65 C.J.S. Negligence 63(45), at 733 (1966) : "The duty of exercising or-
dinary care for the safety of business visitors may require one who invites the
public to his premises to purchase goods to take measures different from those
required of one inviting others to his private residence, and a person who enters
a private residence even for purposes connected with the owner's business is en-
titled to expect only such preparation as a reasonably prudent householder makes
for the reception of such visitors to secure their safety. The measure of duty
owed to an invitee is greater than that due to a licensee." The weight of author-
ity seems not to make any such distinction, and the Louisiana courts have made
no statements indicating the adoption of this rule.
25. 113 So. 2d 309 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1959).
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are principally standards and degrees of negligence for the
reason that no one is so gifted with foresight that he or
she could anticipate every possible legal cause for personal
injury and prescribe the proper rule for each. 26
The courts have always emphasized that the occupier is not
the insurer of the safety of his invitees. 27 He does not have to
make the premises foolproof from all freak accidents. 28 The
landowner, also, is not liable for the unfortunate accidents oc-
curring on his premises through no fault of his own.29 The courts
have not exclusively employed the test of whether the hidden
hazard would have been disclosed with proper inspection, but
rather have also looked at whether the defect was such a hazard
that an injury was foreseeable.30 The courts seem to be more in-
clined to look to foreseeability and degree of hazard rather than
to constructive or actual knowledge of the vice.
Two recent cases illustrate this new approach. In Savell v.
Foster3' plaintiff went to defendant's service station to indicate
repairs he wished done to his automobile. As he watched the
mechanics, he attempted to open a defective window which fell
and crushed his hand. Although the mechanics admitted know-
ing about the vice and failing to warn the plaintiff, the court
denied recovery because the defendant could not reasonably an-
ticipate the plaintiff would open a defective window.
In Bougon v. Traders Gen. Ins. Co. 32 the court demonstrates
how a sliding scale of reasonable care is used to ease the duty
now imposed on the owner to inspect his property for a social
guest. Plaintiff, a social guest, was injured while diving into
a private swimming pool. Although there was a slight defect
in the diving board, the court held negligence had not been
proved. The test set forth was:
"It is his duty to fend against possibility of injury but should
an accident and an injury occur which could not have been
26. Id. at 311.
27. See, e.g., Chauvin v. Atlas Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 581 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964) ; Daire v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 143 So. 2d 389 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962).
28. See, e.g., Allen v. Honeycutt, 171 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965)
Magoni v. Wells, 154 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; Morel v. Franklin
Stores Corp., 91 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1956).
29. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Zurich Ins. Co., 153 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
30. See, e.g., Chauvin v. Atlas Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 581 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964).
31. 149 So. 2d 210 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
32. 146 So. 2d 535 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
(Vol. XXVII
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reasonably anticipated, it cannot be considered actionable
negligence. The accident must have been such that when
considering all the facts and circumstances in connection
therewith, it must have been reasonably foreseen by a man
of ordinary intelligence and prudence .... The courts must
consider that there was a probable or reasonably foreseeable
danger rather than a remote possibility that an accident
might happen, resulting in an injury. 3
To a certain extent the duty of the occupier to protect invitees
on his premises eludes definition. Generally he must warn the
invitee of hidden traps and nonapparent defects when the in-
vitee is not in a position to recognize or fully appreciate the full
extent of danger.34  The occupier must also remedy those condi-
tions so extremely hazardous that the invitee could not avoid
them and use the premises safely even while exercising the ut-
most caution.35 The test being reasonableness, there is no duty
to alter the premises to make them absolutely safe. 36 One has
the right to assume the invitee will conduct himself in a reason-
ably prudent manner and avoid apparent dangers.3 7
Work Area Rule
The invitee has only a right to go on those parts of the
premises to which his invitation extends. The "work area"
doctrine is a qualification unchanged by the court's extension of
invitee status. The invitee has the right to assume the aisle
and areas where business is carried on have been made safe
in anticipation of his use.3 8  Also the social guest has only the
right to go into those areas where he has been invited. The
33. Id. at 537.
34. Frederick v. J. E. Hixson & Sons, 159 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964)
Howard v. Early Chevrolet-Pontiac-Cadillac Inc., 150 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1963) Levine v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 149 So. 2d 433 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1963) Dyer v. Stephens Buick Co., 125 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1960).
35. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 50, at. 545 (1955), as quoted in Sherrill v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 132 So. 2d 72, 74 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) : "'However,
even though the invitee has -knowledge of the danger, or the defect is obvious, the
duty of the owner or occupant to use reasonable care to keep the premises reason-
ably safe for invitee remains, and it runs concurrently with the duty of the invitee
to protect himself, so that where the invitee does not fully appreciate the danger,
or is without fault, the owner or occupant may be held liable for injury.' "
36. See, e.g., Fradger v. Shaffer-Stein Corp., 73 So. 2d 612 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1954); Regenbogen v. Southern Shipwrecking Corp., 41 So. 2d 110 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1949).
37. Lluckaby v. Bellow, 175 So. 2d 914 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) ; Sherrill v.
Uniited States Fid. & Guar. Co., 132 So. 2d 72 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
38. Bowers v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 131 So. 2d 70 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1961).
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customer cannot go behind a counter and expect to find the same
safe conditions he enjoys in the rest of the store ;9 nor can the
social guest roam freely into areas where he reasonably should
know the invitor did not intend to allow him and then complain
that a proper inspection had not been made.40 An express invita-
tion to enter these places, however, does give him the rights of
an invitee,41 though the degree of reasonable care is reduced.
On the other hand, an implied invitation amounting to no more
than failing to object when a person abuses his invitation by
going into a work area has been held insufficient to grant invitee
status. 42
DETERMINING WHETHER DUTY HAS BEEN BREACHED
DEFENSES I
As the courts move from technical classifications to an ex-
amination of each particular case a degree of stability is achieved
in determining breach of duty.
The plaintiff's attorney should seldom have to worry whether
his client can somehow be fitted under the "legal wire" to enjoy
the fullest protection of the law. The defendant's attorney, on
the other hand, has jurisprudence to guide him in deciding what
defenses may most effectively be applied to the particular facts
in his case. A survey of these defenses and how they have been
applied probably gives the best view of how the changing con-
cepts in this area have affected the rights and duties of the
landowner.
The Object Must Be Hazardous
The first requirement to maintain a suit against a landowner
for an accident is to show that the accident was caused by a
hazardous condition. The extraneous object or condition must
be itself inherently or potentially hazardous; if not, there is no
breach of duty. In Joynes v. Valloft & Dreaux43 a soft drink
bottle fell off a candy counter and shattered. There was no
showing that the bottle was placed too near the edge, that the
counter was cluttered with bottles, or that the bottle had
39. Foshe v. Grant, 152 La. 303, 93 So. 102 (1922) ; Burbank v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 42 La. Ann. 1156, 8 So. 580 (1890) ; Clement v. Bohning, 159 So. 2d 495
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 343, comment b (1965).
41. Clement v. Bohning, 159 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) ; cf. Manning
v. Morrison Cafeterias Consol., Inc., 160 So. 2d 818 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
42. Clement v. Bohning, 159 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
43. 1 So. 2d 108 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1941).
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remained there for an unreasonable time. The court implied
that a soft drink bottle is not of itself a hazardous object; normal
conduct can be carried on without taking special precautions to
guard against knocking a bottle off a counter. The court set
out the following rule:
"Where it is sought to hold liable a storekeeper for injuries
resulting from some extraneous substance or object, there is
no liability unless it appears, first that the object is danger-
ous, and second that it was allowed to remain a source of
danger for too long a time. '
44
In Lejeune v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.45 the court reiterated
this requirement. Plaintiff, a customer in a department store
tripped on a chair in the aisle while looking at merchandise.
She could not show that the displays were so ingeniously ar-
ranged as to distract her from looking where she was walking.
In denying recovery the court remarked that it is "fundamental
in our law that the extraneous instrumentality or other object
causing the accident must be inherently or potentially danger-
ous."' 40 The court showed no concern over how long the chair
had been in the aisle or who had placed it there.
Not every object causing an accident will result in the oc-
cupier being liable. The plaintiff must establish that the condi-
tion was of such a nature as to be reasonably foreseen as a po-
tential cause of danger.47 In Boute v. American Motorists Ins.
Co.,4s plaintiff, a social guest, was cut by an ordinary electric
fan on a hallway floor as she slipped and reached out to stop her
fall. The court admitted that a fan was a hazardous object, but
applied a foreseeability test to deny recovery.
The Injury Must Be Foreseeable
In Morel v. Franklin Stores Corp.49 the court denied recovery
in an admittedly close case. While shopping in defendant's store,
44. Id. at 113.
45. 136 So. 2d 157 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1901).
46. Id. at 159. See also Allen v. Honeycutt, 171 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1965) ; Henderson v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 161 So. 2d 144 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1964); Magoni v. Wells, 154 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; Kenning v.
Herrin Transp. Co., 148 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; Himel v. Ryder,
146 So. 2d 209 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Vogts v. Schwegmann, 56 So. 2d 177
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1952). But see Reid v. Monticello, 33 So. 2d 760 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1948).
47. Chauvin v. Atlas Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 581 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964)
Longlois v. Ackel, 146 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
48. 176 So. 2d 833 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
49. 91 So. 2d 42 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956).
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plaintiff told an employee she would like to remain, but that she
had promised to meet her husband at a designated time. The
employee offered to let her use a telephone behind a counter.
She tripped on a three-quarter inch cable lying on the floor, the
existence of which was known to the employees, but no warning
was given to the plaintiff. The court found the facts did not
disclose a hazard which would foreseeably cause an injury.
The Possibility of the Injury Must not be too Remote
The question asked is whether the injury is reasonably ex-
pected to flow from the hazard. If the answer is negative, but
some minor harm was foreseeable, the court will find due care
has been observed. Quite a different question appears when an
occupier allows an inherently dangerous condition to remain be-
cause the possibility of the accident ever happening is too remote.
The court must decide whether the chance of the accident is so
small that it would be ridiculous to demand that the occupier
guard against it or give a warning to each person coming in
contact with it. Since the landowner is not an insurer of the
safety of the invitee, he need not be on constant vigilance to
guard against all foreseeable, but freak, accidents.50
In Campbell v. All State Ins. Co.5 1 defendant asked plaintiff
to help him repair a lawnmower.52  Plaintiff pulled the cord
several times in an attempt to start the machine. The cord met
with no resistance and the plaintiff flew back, breaking his arm
against a wall. It was proved that defendant knew the cord
slipped, and that it had done so about four times a year. The
court held that the accident was too remote to warrant special
care.
The court also felt it was too remote that a man would walk
into the kitchen of a cafe, get a gun, and shoot his common law
50. Kennedy v. Columbia Cas. Co., 174 So. 2d 869 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965)
Roca v. Prats, 80 So. 2d 176 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955).
51. 112 So. 2d 143 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959).
52. Ibid. The fact that plaintiff was not on the land of defendant did not faze
the court. "Generally an invitee is held to be a person who goes on the premises
of another in answer to an express or implied invitation of the other. . . In the
instant case, Campbell had not been invited to go on premises belonging to Ellard
but he had been requested to perform a gratitous service or favor for Ellard. That
Ellard did not own the premises is immaterial under the circumstances, he having
chosen the place to work on his mower and having designated the place at which
he wished the requested service performed. Ellard, in making the request of
Campbell, selecting the place and assisting in the execution of the act, assumed
toward Campbell the same legal status as the owner of property who expressly
or tacitly invites another upon his premises to perform some desired service."
Id. at 147.
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wife while a state trooper was sitting at the next table.13  In
so finding the court set out the rule covering remoteness of ac-
cidents.
"Negligence consists in a failure to provide against the or-
dinary occurrences of life, and the fact that the provision
made it insufficient as against an event such as may happen
once in a lifetime or perhaps twice in a century does not...
make out a case of negligence upon which an action in dam-
ages will lie."'
54
DEFENSES II
These three defenses discussed before have one thing in com-
mon: they do not have to be proved in their absolute form to deny
recovery. Seldom is a condition resulting in an accident found
totally unhazardous, nor on accident completely unforeseeable
or too remote. These are flexible concepts which courts use,
often in combination, in an attempt to determine whether that
nebulous margin of reasonable care has been crossed. These
elements are merely guidelines by which the sliding scale of
reasonable care can be fitted to particular facts.
Apparent Defects
On the other hand, there are two legal defenses long recog-
nized by the courts which, like contributory negligence, will ab-
solutely bar recovery.5 5 They are that the hazard is apparent,
and that the occupier has no actual or constructive knowledge
of hazards not created by himself.
A user of another's property is expected to exercise reason-
able care in avoiding being injured by apparent hazards. The
occupier's duty does not extend to a requirement of altering his
premises in order to receive his guest.5 6 He, being the owner
of the land, has the right to make it what he wishes. This
policy has led the courts to remark that before an invitee can
be successful in a suit, he must show fault by the landowner and
53. Callender v. Wilson, 162 So. 2d 203 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
54. Id. at 206, quoting from New Orleans & N.E. R.R. v. McEven & Murray,
49 La. Ann. 1184, 22 So. 675, 680 (1897).
55. Parvino v. Wellman's Funeral Parlors Inc., 176 So. 2d 749 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1965) ; Kenning v. Herrin Transp. Co., 148 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1963) Lafitte v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 121 So. 2d 774 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1960) Crittenden v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 83 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955).
56. See cases cited notes 34 and 35 supra.
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ignorance of the danger by the invitee.57  Levert v. Travelers
Indem. Co. 58 expressed the rule:
"The duty of an occupier of premises to an invitee is to ex-
ercise reasonable or ordinary care for his safety commensu-
rate with the particular circumstances involved. The oc-
cupier thus owes a duty to avoid reasonably foreseeable
danger to his invitee and keep his premises safe from hidden
dangers in the nature of traps or pitfalls in that they are
not known to the invitee and would not be observed and
appreciated by him in the exercise of ordinary care. This
includes the duty of reasonable prior discovery of such un-
observable dangerous conditions of the premises and correc-
tion thereof or a warning to the invitee of the danger.
"On the other hand, the occupier does not insure an in-
-vitee against the possibility of accident. The invitee assumes
all normally observable or ordinary risks attendant upon the
use of the premises. The occupier is not liable for an injury
to an invitee resulting from a danger which is observable or
which should have been observed by the invitee in the ex-
ercise of reasonable care, or from a danger which the invitee
should reasonably have appreciated before exposing himself
to it." 591
Before an apparent defect will bar recovery, the invitee must
be in such a position, or should have been in such a position, 0
to be fully apprised of the risk involved. If the plaintiff can
show that he was aware of a certain degree of hazard, but that
the hazard was of such a nature that he reasonably could not
comprehend the true extent of danger, he is still entitled to
recover.
61
As a general rule any slick, wet but adequately lighted surface
is an apparent hazard and the risk is assumed by the user.6 2 Miller
v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. 6 3 demonstrates how far this doctrine
57. See, e.g., Richards v. Schwcgmann Bros. Inc., 151 So. 2d 142 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1963) ; Cannon v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 146 So. 2d 804 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1962).
58. 140 So. 2d 811 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
59. Id. at 813.
60. Sherrill v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 132 So. 2d 72 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1961).
61. Fowler v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 169 So. 2d 754 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964)
Frederick v. J. E. Iixon & Sons, 159 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
62. Lawson v. D. H. Holmes Co., 200 So. 163 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1941).
63. 164 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1964-1965 Term-Torts, 26 LA. L.: REV. 510
(1966).
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has been carried. The assured operated a beauty shop. The
weather was extremely cold and snow had lain on the ground for
four days. Plaintiff admitted she was aware of the danger of
slipping on ice and snow, so well aware that at the time of the
accidents she was wearing rubber-soled tennis shoes. Ap-
parently the defendant did not share the plaintiff's full apprecia-
tion of the danger because he allowed the snow and ice to remain
on his private sidewalk without taking the precaution of sprin-
kling salt, sand, or ashes. Plaintiff slipped on the sidewalk and
was seriously injured. The court found the defendant had been
negligent, but denied recovery on the grounds that the hazard
was obvious and the invitee was in a position to fully appreciate
the danger involved. One dissenting judge made this observa-
tion:
"Under such a theory, the more unreasonable a hazard and
the greater the danger created to others by the condition,
the less negligent is the occupier of the premises in maintain-
ing a hazard endangering his customers' safety in their use
of the premises per the implied invitation of the shop owner
that they do so." '64
The decision seems manifestly unjust and incorrect. The court
in stating the rule applicable italicized what seems to have been
its error:
"The circumstance that the entrance way to a commercial
building may be more slippery in wet weather than in dry
is not of itself sufficient to constitute actionable negligence
on the part of the property owner, when such a, condition is
observable by a reasonably prudent person of ordinary in-
telligence and when the entranceway can be traversed in
safety by the exercise of ordinary care."-,
The findings of the majority seem to belie the fact that the side-
walk could have been used safely even with the exercise of extra-
ordinary care. 6
The holding in the Miller case, however, is supported by long
64. Id. at 683.
65. Id. at 681, quoting from St. Julien v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 127 So. 2d
245, 247 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
66. Frederick v. J. E. Hixson & Sons, 159 So.2d 599 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964)
Howard v. Early Chevrolet-Pontiac-Cadillac Inc., 150 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1963); Levine v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 149 So. 2d 433 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1963) ; Dyer v. Stephens Buick Co., 125 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1960).
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and sound jurisprudence. 67 The court merely failed to observe
that ice is more treacherous than rain slick surfaces. The only
case which may have modified this rather absolute stand is
Hesse v. Marquette Cas. Co.68 But this case is subject to being
distinguished on the grounds that the court found the area
"poorly lighted." In this case, plaintiff walked into the foyer
of a night club where water had accumulated on the floor. The
court found the floor was of a material that lacked a non-slip
ingredient, and the rain had been able to come under the door
because of faulty construction. Knowing this the manager had
not put up a canopy, nor placed rubber mats to protect his
customers. The court simply stated its reason for allowing
recovery:
"There are myriads of factual situations involved in cases
of this kind, and application of the principles of law to each
case must be applied by the Court in conformity with the
true civil law concept.... He [the proprietor] must maintain
his premises in a reasonably safe condition. If he maintains
any furnishings or equipment therein which probably, fore-
seeably, or reasonably, will cause damage to others he should
provide adequate safeguards to avert an accident." 69
The concept of apparent hazards has been applied to numer-
ous situations: a man failing to notice a step in a hallway when
he should have been able to see it from the fact that the room
he was entering was lower than the one he had just left;70
a woman slipping on a loose rug which she knew was not
properly fastened ;71 and even a woman hit in the lower abdomen
by a bowling ball.72
The apparent danger rule seems to have absorbed, if not
embodied, the defense of assumption of risk. The courts' prefer-
ence to talk in terms of apparent and obvious defects instead of
assumption of risk may be due to their familiarity with the
67. Burns v. Child's Properties, Inc., 156 So. 2d 610 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963)
Baker v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 136 So. 2d 828 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961)
St. Julien v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 127 So. 2d 245 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Lawson
v. D. H. Holmes Co., 200 So. 163 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1941) ; Battles v. Wellan,
195 So. 663 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
68. 170 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
69. Id. at 176.
70. Magoni v. Wells, 154 So. 2d 534 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
71. Alexander v. General Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 98 So. 2d 730 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1957).
72. Alfortish v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 171 So. 2d 705 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1965).
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former terms in the law of warranty in the Civil Code. 73  The
court did, however, deny recovery on the basis of assumption of
risk in Regenbagan v. Southern Shipwrecking Corp.74 Plaintiff
fell when he walked across a plank which connected two ships
being dismantled for salvage. Defendant's agent had gone be-
fore and had jumped off the plank before reaching the end.
Plaintiff walked past the place where the agent had jumped
and the board upended. The court held:
"Where an employee is not placed by an employer in a posi-
tion of undisclosed danger but is a mature man, doing the
ordinary work which he was engaged to do and whose risks
are obvious to anyone, he assumes the risks of the employ-
ment.'",7 5
No Actual or Constructive Knowledge
The occupier also may use the defense that he had no actual
or constructive knowledge of extraneous objects left on the pre-
mises by a third person. 70 This defense is perennial in slip-fall
cases in supermarkets. In order to recover, a plaintiff must
show that the extraneous object was placed on the floor through
the occupier's own negligence,77 or, if a third person was respon-
sible, that the object was allowed to remain on the floor for
such an unreasonable length of time that defendant had failed
in his duty to inspect and to remedy hazardous conditions.7 8
In the landmark case of Peters v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co.,79 a woman pushing a shopping cart slipped on a bean
on the floor. Plaintiff attempted to use the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, but the court found the doctrine inapplicable and found
that the plaintiff failed to prove negligence:
"Even if we concede, however, that her foot slipped upon a
bean which had fallen to the floor still plaintiff has entirely
failed to prove that the bean remained on the floor for such
a period of time that it became the duty of the defendant to
73. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2521 (1870) dealing with apparent defects as red-
hibitory vice.
74. 41 So. 2d 110 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1949).
75. Id. at 113.
76. Lawson v. Continental Southern Lines, Inc., 176 So. 2d 220 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1965) denied recovery.
77. Dever v. George Theriot's Inc., 159 So. 2d 602 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964)
Reid v. Monticello, 33 So. 2d 760 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948).
78. See, e.g., Vogts v. Schwegmann, 56 So. 2d 177 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1952).
79. 72 So. 2d 562 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
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notice and remove it from the floor. In failing to do this
plaintiff has failed to prove fault on the part of the defendant
to the extent required in order to assess liability." 80
This places an almost insurmountable burden of proof upon
the plaintiff."' Often the plaintiff in such a case must rely on
adverse witnesses in the employ of the defendant to re-establish
the events of the accidents. Plaintiff through cross-examination
is able to elicit the inspection procedure of defendant. Yet, he
is thereby left with making out a case on often unreliable testi-
mony.82
Even if the inspection procedure is found to be inadequate
it must also be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
the extraneous object had been on the floor for too unreasonable
a time.
This defense will not protect an occupier from his own neg-
ligence or the negligence of his agents.8 3 There is no require-
ment of constructive knowledge in such a case. In Dever v.
George Theriot's Inc.84 the court remarked:
"A similar rule of notice of the hazard does not apply when
the storekeeper's employees themselves created the danger
through some act on their part. In this latter instance, the
storekeeper is liable under the principle of respondeat
superior for the negligent acts of his employees in creating an
unreasonable hazard to the storekeeper's invitees.
' '85
80. Id. at 565.
81. Lester v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 155 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963)
Hickingbottom v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 147 So. 2d 102 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962)
Cannon v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 146 So. 2d 804 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962).; Hays v. Maison Blanche Co., 30 So. 2d 225 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1947) ; Cases
allowing recovery: Redon v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co,, 161 So. 762 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1935) ; Theodore v. J. G. McCrory Co., 17 La. App. 684, 137 So. 352 (Orl.
Cir. 1931).
82. See Cannon v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 146 So. 2d 804, 812 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1962) (dissent) : "The store keeper has in its possession all of the
evidence surrounding what made this floor slippery, if it was. It is only natural
that the store employees feel that no fault on their part or on the part of their
co-employees, with whom they associate daily, had contributed to the accident.
Whether they are accurate in this feeling and whether their testimony at the
trial, more than a year after the accident, truly reflects what they actually saw
and knew at the time (or rather is what they thought should have been the situa-
tion or is what mutual inter-conversations over the year had assured them was
the situation), is a matter for the trial court to determine by its evaluation of the
credibility and accuracy of the witnesses."
83. Henderson v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 161 So. 2d 144 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1964) ; Ransom v. Kreeger Store, Inc., 158 So. 600 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935).
84. 159 So. 2d 602 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
85. Id. at 604.
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Probability of occurrence affects the scope of the duty to
inspect for and discover dangerous objects left on the land by a
licensee. In Wilkinson v. Hussen86 plaintiff sat on a trick chair
which had been placed there by a third party. The court
reversed a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendants:
"An owner of property or premises may be liable for in-
jury. . . where it was caused by an act, connected with the
property, which he permitted another to do, or by a defective
or dangerous condition of the premises which he permitted
another to create.
"An owner of premises may be liable for injuries caused
by their defective or dangerous condition even though they
are in the possession of a licensee. Generally speaking, how-
ever, an owner of land is not liable for an injury caused by
the acts of a licensee unless such acts constitute a nuisance
which the owner knowingly suffers to remain."'
The court arrived at the correct result, but seems to have
applied the wrong rule. The rule stated implies the landowner
needs actual knowledge of the dangerous object placed on his
property by a third party. There seems to be no reason why the
rule in Peters v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. should not
be applied. Then a determination should be made as to whether
the defendant had constructive knowledge.
The rule applied by the court should logically be restricted
to actual physical acts done on the premises by a licensee without
the actual knowledge of the occupier.
Constructive knowledge is a presumption producing the same
effect as actual knowledge. There must be facts known to the
occupant which would influence a reasonable man to make
further inquiry."8 Thus if the landowner would have no reason
to expect that some hazardous object had been placed on his
premises, it would seem illogical to require him to make routine,
periodic inspections to discover possible dangers. The degree
of reasonableness should be adjusted to fit the particular circum-
stances and facilities of the occupier.
86. 154 So. 2d 490 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
87. Id. at 496, quoting 65 C.J.S. Negligence §§ 92a, 92, at 605, 606 (1955
ed.) now § 92, at 1045, 1042 (1966 ed.).
88. Longlois v. Ackel, 146 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962)
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CONCLUSION
The doctrine of imputed knowledge gives sound support to
the distinction between guest and licensee allowed only by suf-
ferance. Only a fine line separates this class from trespassers.
To the licensee the occupier should owe a duty of reasonable
care 9 for he has consented to his presence. However, it would
be too burdensome to require the landowner to prepare his pro-
perty for their reception. Enough is asked by requiring him to
repair known defects to guard their safety. On the other hand,
when he throws open his premises and invites one to enter, he
voluntarily assumes the responsibility of protecting his guests
from injury. A hermit should be allowed to live his life, but
one who holds open his doors to his friends and business guests
cannot be heard to say he has the right to disregard the well-
being of those who give him entertainment and profit.
Benjamin F. Day
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 341 (1965), PaossEn, TOBTS § 60, at
388 (3d ed. 1964) : "[T]he earlier decisions frequently said that there was no
duty to a licensee except to refrain from injuring him intentionally, or by wilful,
wanton or reckless conduct. . . . [A]n increasing regard for human safety has
led to a gradual modification of this position, and the greater number of courts
now expressly reject it. It is now generally held that as to any active operations
which the occupier carries on, there is an obligation to exercise reasonable care
for the protection of a licensee."
(Vol. XXVII
